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Abstract: In this paper we argue that the main determinant of differences in prosperity 
across countries are differences in economic institutions. To solve the problem of 
development will entail reforming these institutions. Unfortunately, this is difficult 
because economic institutions are collective choices that are the outcome of a political 
process. The economic institutions of a society depend on the nature of political 
institutions and the distribution of political power in society. As yet, we only have a 
highly preliminary understanding of the factors that lead a society into a political 
equilibrium which supports good economic institutions. However, it is clear that it is the 
political nature of an institutional equilibrium that makes it very difficult to reform 
economic institutions. We illustrate this with a series of pitfalls of institutional reforms. 
Our analysis reveals challenges for those who would wish to solve the problem of 
development and poverty. That such challenges exist is hardly surprising and we believe 
that the main reason for such challenges is the forces we have outlined in this paper. 
Better development policy will only come when we recognize this and understand these 
forces better. Nevertheless, some countries do undergo political transitions, reform 
their institutions, and move onto more successful paths of economic development. We 
also can learn a lot from these success stories. 
 
JEL classification: O10, P10, P17 
Keywords: economic growth, development, institutions and political economy 
 
This paper was previously published as Commission on Growth and Development 
Working Paper, n. 10 (2008). The Review of Economics and Institutions is grateful to the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, for having 
authorized its reproduction here. 
                                                 
Corresponding author. Address: MIT, Department of Economics, 50 Memorial Drive 
Building E52, Room 380B, Cambridge MA 02142-1347. (Phone: 001-617-2531927, Fax: 001-
617-2531330, Email: daron@mit.edu) 
Acemoglu, Robinson, The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/14 2 
 
1 Introduction 
Arguably the most important questions in social science concern the 
causes of cross-country differences in economic development and 
economic growth. Why are some countries much poorer than others? Why 
do some countries achieve economic growth while others stagnate? And 
to the extent that we can develop some answers to these questions, and the 
next ones: what can be done in order to induce economic growth and 
improve the living standards in a society? 
Economists have long recognized that output per capita in a society is 
intimately related to the amount of human capital, physical capital, and 
technology that workers and firms in that country have access to. 
Similarly, economic growth is related to the ability of a society to increase 
its human capital, physical capital, and improve its technology. In this 
context, technology is construed broadly; technological differences refer 
not only to differences in techniques available to the firms, but also to 
differences in the organization of production, implying that some 
countries will be able to use their resources more efficiently. Nevertheless, 
differences in human capital, physical capital, and technology are only 
proximate causes in the sense that they pose the next question of why some 
countries have less human capital, physical capital, and technology and 
make worse use of their factors and opportunities. To develop more 
satisfactory answers to questions of why some countries are much richer 
than others and why some countries grow much faster than others, we 
need to look for potential fundamental causes, which may be underlying 
these proximate differences across countries. Only by understanding these 
fundamental causes we can develop a framework for making policy 
recommendations that go beyond platitudes (such as “improve your 
technology”) and also minimize the risk of unintended negative 
consequences. 
In this essay, we will argue that institutions, also very broadly 
construed, are the fundamental cause of economic growth and 
development differences across countries and that it is possible to develop 
a coherent framework for understanding why and how institutions differ 
across countries, and how they change. We will also argue that our state of 
knowledge does not yet enable us to make specific statements about how 
institutions can be improved (in order to promote further economic 
growth). Nevertheless, we can use this framework in several ways. One is 
to illustrate the potential pitfalls of institutional reforms. Though this in itself 
is not a solution to the problem of development, avoiding such pitfalls 
may be valuable enough to start with. We can also use the framework to 
structure our understanding of cases of economic success. Though such an 
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ex post understanding is not a substitute for policy, it is the first step 
towards the goal of knowing how to reform institutions. 
2 What Are Institutions? 
Douglass North (1990, p. 3) offers the following definition: “Institutions 
are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction.” Three important 
features of institutions are apparent in this definition: (1) that they are 
“humanly devised,” which contrasts with other potential fundamental 
causes, like geographic factors, which are outside human control; (2) that 
they are “the rules of the game” setting “constraints” on human behavior; 
(3) that their major effect will be through incentives (see also North, 1981). 
The notion that incentives matter is second nature to economists, and 
institutions, if they are a key determinant of incentives, should have a 
major effect on economic outcomes, including economic development, 
growth, inequality, and poverty. But do they? Are institutions key 
determinants of economic outcomes or secondary arrangements that 
respond to other, perhaps geographic or cultural, determinants of human 
and economic interactions? 
Much empirical research attempts to answer this question. Before 
discussing some of this research, it is useful to emphasize an important 
point: ultimately, the aim of the research on institutions is to pinpoint 
specific institutional characteristics that are responsible for economic 
outcomes in specific situations (for example, the effect of legal institutions 
on the types of business contracts). However, the starting point is often the 
impact of a broader notion of institutions on a variety of economic 
outcomes. This broader notion, in line with Douglass North's conception, 
incorporates many aspects of economics and the political and social 
organization of society. Institutions can differ between societies because of 
their formal methods of collective decision-making (democracy versus 
dictatorship) or because of their economic institutions (security of 
property rights, entry barriers, the set of contracts available to 
businessmen). They may also differ because a given set of formal 
institutions are expected to and do function differently; for example, they 
may differ between two societies that are democratic because the 
distribution of political power lies with different groups or social classes, 
or because in one society democracy is expected to collapse while in the 
other it is consolidated. This broad definition of institutions is both an 
advantage and a curse. It is an advantage because it enables us to get 
started with theoretical and empirical investigations of the role of 
institutions without getting bogged down by taxonomies. It is a curse 
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because unless we can follow it up with a better understanding of the role 
of specific institutions, we have learned only little. 
3 The Impact of Institutions 
There are tremendous cross-country differences in the way that 
economic and political life is organized. A voluminous literature 
documents large cross-country differences in economic institutions, and a 
strong correlation between these institutions and economic performance. 
Knack and Keefer (1995), for instance, looked at measures of property 
rights enforcement compiled by international business organizations, 
Mauro (1995) looked at measures of corruption, and Djankov et al. (2002) 
compiled measures of entry barriers across countries. Many other studies 
look at variation in educational institutions and the corresponding 
differences in human capital. All of these authors find substantial 
differences in these measures of economic institutions, and significant 
correlation between these measures and various indicators of economic 
performance. For example, Djankov et al. (2002) found that, while the total 
cost of opening a medium-size business in the United States was less than 
0.02 percent of GDP per capita in 1999, the same cost was 2.7 percent of 
GDP per capita in Nigeria, 1.16 percent in Kenya, 0.91 percent in Ecuador, 
and 4.95 percent in the Dominican Republic. These entry barriers are 
highly correlated with various economic outcomes, including the rate of 
economic growth and the level of development. 
Nevertheless, this type of correlation does not establish that the 
countries with worse institutions are poor because of their institutions. 
After all, the United States differs from Nigeria, Kenya, and the 
Dominican Republic in its social, geographic, cultural, and economic 
fundamentals, so these may be the source of their poor economic 
performance. In fact, these differences may be the source of institutional 
differences themselves. Consequently, evidence based on correlation does 
not establish whether institutions are important determinants of economic 
outcomes. 
To make further progress, one needs to isolate a source of exogenous 
differences in institutions, so that we approximate a situation in which a 
number of otherwise-identical societies end up with different sets of 
institutions. European colonization of the rest of the world provides a 
potential laboratory to investigate these issues. From the late fifteenth 
century, Europeans dominated and colonized much of the rest of the 
globe. Together with European dominance came the imposition of very 
different institutions and social power structures in different parts of the 
world. 
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Acemoglu et al. (2001) document that in a large number of colonies, 
especially those in Africa, Central America, the Caribbean, and South 
Asia, European powers set up “extractive states.” These institutions (again 
broadly construed) did not introduce much protection for private 
property, nor did they provide checks and balances against the 
government. The explicit aim of the European in these colonies was 
extraction of resources, in one form or another. This colonization strategy 
and the associated institutions contrast with the institutions Europeans set 
up in other colonies, especially in colonies where they settled in large 
numbers, for example, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand. In these colonies the emphasis was on the enforcement of 
property rights for a broad cross section of the society, especially 
smallholders, merchants, and entrepreneurs. The term “broad cross 
section” is emphasized here, since even in the societies with the worst 
institutions, the property rights of the elite are often secure, but the vast 
majority of the population enjoys no such rights and faces significant 
barriers preventing their participation in many economic activities. 
Although investments by the elite can generate economic growth for 
limited periods, for sustained growth property rights for a broad cross 
section seem to be crucial (Acemoglu, 2008). 
A crucial determinant of whether Europeans chose the path of 
extractive institutions was whether they settled in large numbers. In 
colonies where Europeans settled, the institutions were being developed 
for their own future benefits. In colonies where Europeans did not settle, 
their objective was to set up a highly centralized state apparatus, and 
other associated institutions, to oppress the native population and 
facilitate the extraction of resources in the short run. Based on this idea, 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) suggest that in places where the 
disease environments made it easy for Europeans to settle, the path of 
institutional development should have been different from areas where 
Europeans faced high mortality rates. 
In practice, during the time of colonization, Europeans faced widely 
different mortality rates in colonies because of differences in the 
prevalence of malaria and yellow fever. These therefore provide a possible 
candidate for a source of exogenous variation in institutions. These 
mortality rates should not influence output today directly, but by affecting 
the settlement patterns of Europeans, they may have had a first-order 
effect on institutional development. Consequently, these potential settler 
mortality rates can be used as an instrument for broad institutional 
differences across countries in an instrumental-variables estimation 
strategy. 
The key requirement for an instrument is that it should have no direct 
effect on the outcome of interest (other than its effect via the endogenous 
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regressor). There are a number of channels through which potential settler 
mortality could influence current economic outcomes or may be correlated 
with other factors influencing these outcomes. Nevertheless, there are also 
good reasons for why, as a first approximation, these mortality rates 
should not have a direct effect. Malaria and yellow fever were fatal to 
Europeans who had no immunity, thus having a major effect on 
settlement patterns, but they had much more limited effects on natives 
who, over centuries, had developed various types of immunities. The 
exclusion restriction is also supported by the death rates of native 
populations, which appear to be similar between areas with very different 
mortality rates for Europeans (see, for example, Curtin, 1964). 
The data also show that there were major differences in the institutional 
development of the high-mortality and low-mortality colonies. Moreover, 
consistent with the key idea in Acemoglu et al. (2001), various measures of 
broad institutions, for example, measures of protection against 
expropriation, are highly correlated with the death rates Europeans faced 
more than 100 years ago and with early European settlement patterns. 
They also show that these institutional differences induced by mortality 
rates and European settlement patterns have a major (and robust) effect on 
income per capita. For example, the estimates imply that improving 
Nigeria's institutions to the level of those in Chile could, in the long run, 
lead to as much as a 7-fold increase in Nigeria's income. This evidence 
suggests that once we focus on potentially exogenous sources of variation, 
the data points to a large effect of broad institutional differences on 
economic development. 
Naturally, mortality rates faced by Europeans were not the only 
determinant of Europeans' colonization strategies. Acemoglu et al. (2002) 
focus on another important aspect, how densely different regions were 
settled before colonization. They document that in more densely settled 
areas, Europeans were more likely to introduce extractive institutions 
because it was more profitable for them to exploit the indigenous 
population, either by having them work in plantations and mines, or by 
maintaining the existing system and collecting taxes and tributes. This 
suggests another source of variation in institutions that may have 
persisted to the present, and Acemoglu et al. (2002) show similar large 
effects from this source of variation. 
Another example that illustrates the consequences of difference in 
institutions is the contrast between the Democratic People‟s Republic of 
Korea and the Republic of Korea. The geopolitical balance between the 
Soviet Union and the United States following the World War II led to 
separation along the 38th parallel. The Democratic People‟s Republic of 
Korea, under the dictatorship of Kim Il Sung, adopted a very centralized 
command economy with little role for private property. In the meantime, 
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the Republic of Korea relied on a capitalist organization of the economy, 
with private ownership of the means of production, and legal protection 
for a range of producers, especially those under the umbrella of the 
chaebols, the large family conglomerates that dominated the Republic of 
Korea‟s economy. Although not democratic during its early phases, the 
Republic of Korea‟s state was generally supportive of rapid development 
and is often credited with facilitating, or even encouraging, investment 
and rapid growth. 
Under these two highly contrasting regimes, the economies of the 
Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea 
diverged. While the Republic of Korea has grown rapidly under capitalist 
institutions and policies, the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea has 
experienced minimal growth since 1950, under communist institutions 
and policies. 
Overall, a variety of evidence paints a picture in which broad 
institutional differences across countries have had a major influence on 
their economic development. This evidence suggests that to understand 
why some countries are poor we should understand why their institutions 
are dysfunctional. But this is only part of a first step in the journey 
towards an answer. The next question is even harder: if institutions have 
such a large effect on economic riches, why do some societies choose, end 
up with, and maintain these dysfunctional institutions? 
4 Modeling Institutional Differences 
As a first step in modeling institutions, let us consider the relationship 
between three institutional characteristics: (1) economic institutions; (2) 
political power; (3) political institutions. 
As already mentioned above, economic institutions matter for economic 
growth because they shape the incentives of key economic actors in 
society. In particular, they influence investments in physical and human 
capital and technology and the organization of production. Economic 
institutions not only determine the aggregate economic growth potential 
of the economy, but also the distribution of resources in the society, and 
herein lies part of the problem: different institutions will not only be 
associated with different degrees of efficiency and potential for economic 
growth, but also with different distribution of the gains across different 
individuals and social groups. 
How are economic institutions determined? Although various factors 
play a role here, including history and chance, at the end of the day, 
economic institutions are collective choices of the society. And because of 
their influence on the distribution of economic gains, not all individuals 
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and groups typically prefer the same set of economic institutions. This 
leads to a conflict of interest among various groups and individuals over 
the choice of economic institutions, and the political power of the different 
groups will be the deciding factor. 
The distribution of political power in society is also endogenous. To 
make more progress here, let us distinguish between two components of 
political power - de jure and de facto political power (see Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006a). De jure political power refers to power that originates 
from the political institutions in society. Political institutions, similar to 
economic institutions, determine the constraints on and the incentives of 
the key actors, but this time in the political sphere. Examples of political 
institutions include the form of government, for example, democracy 
versus dictatorship or autocracy, and the extent of constraints on 
politicians and political elites. 
A group of individuals, even if they are not allocated power by political 
institutions, may possess political power; for example, they can revolt, use 
arms, hire mercenaries, co-opt the military, or undertake protests in order 
to impose their wishes on society. This type of de facto political power 
originates from both the ability of the group in question to solve its 
collective action problem and from the economic resources available to the 
group (which determines their capacity to use force against other groups). 
This discussion highlights that we can think of political institutions and 
the distribution of economic resources in society as two state variables, 
affecting how political power will be distributed and how economic 
institutions will be chosen. An important notion is that of persistence; the 
distribution of resources and political institutions are relatively slow-
changing and persistent. Since, like economic institutions, political 
institutions are collective choices, the distribution of political power in 
society is the key determinant of their evolution. This creates a central 
mechanism of persistence: political institutions allocate de jure political 
power, and those who hold political power influence the evolution of 
political institutions, and they will generally opt to maintain the political 
institutions that give them political power. A second mechanism of 
persistence comes from the distribution of resources: when a particular 
group is rich relative to others, this will increase its de facto political 
power and enable it to push for economic and political institutions 
favourable to its interests, reproducing the initial disparity. We shall see 
later that these ideas are powerful in developing ideas about why reform 
is so difficult. Reform comes with pitfalls because either de facto or de jure 
power may persist even if other things change. 
Despite these tendencies for persistence, the framework also 
emphasizes the potential for change. In particular, “shocks” to the balance 
of de facto political power, including changes in technologies and the 
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international environment, have the potential to generate major changes in 
political institutions, and consequently in economic institutions and 
economic growth. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005b) summarized this framework 
with the following schematic representation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 A Simple Historical Example 
As a brief example, consider the development of property rights in 
Europe during the late Middle Ages and Early Modern period. Lack of 
property rights for landowners, merchants, and proto-industrialists was 
detrimental to economic growth during this epoch. Since political 
institutions at the time placed political power in the hands of kings and 
various types of hereditary monarchies, such rights were largely decided 
by these monarchs. The monarchs often used their powers to expropriate 
producers, impose arbitrary taxation, renege on their debts, and allocate 
the productive resources of society to their allies in return for economic 
benefits or political support. Consequently, economic institutions during 
the Middle Ages provided little incentive to invest in land, physical or 
human capital, or technology, and failed to foster economic growth. These 
economic institutions also ensured that the monarchs controlled a large 
fraction of the economic resources in society, solidifying their political 
power, and ensuring the continuation of the political regime. 
The seventeenth century, however, witnessed major changes in the 
economic and political institutions that paved the way for the 
development of property rights and limits on monarchs' power, especially 
in England after the Civil War of 1642 and the Glorious Revolution of 
1688, and in the Netherlands after the Dutch Revolt against the 
Hapsburgs. How did these major institutional changes take place? In 
England until the sixteenth century the king also possessed a substantial 
amount of de facto political power, and leaving aside civil wars related to 
royal succession, no other social group could amass sufficient de facto 
political power to challenge the king. But changes in the English land 
market (Tawney, 1941) and the expansion of Atlantic trade in the sixteenth 
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and seventeenth centuries (Acemoglu et al., 2005a) gradually increased the 
economic fortunes, and consequently the de facto power of landowners 
and merchants opposed to the absolutist tendencies of the kings. 
By the seventeenth century, the growing prosperity of the merchants 
and the gentry, based both on internal and overseas (especially Atlantic) 
trade, enabled them to field military forces capable of defeating the king. 
This de facto power overcame the Stuart monarchs in the Civil War and 
Glorious Revolution, and led to a change in political institutions that 
stripped the king of much of his previous power over policy. These 
changes in the distribution of political power led to major changes in 
economic institutions, strengthening the property rights of both land and 
capital owners and spurring a process of financial and commercial 
expansion. The consequence was rapid economic growth, culminating in 
the Industrial Revolution, and a very different distribution of economic 
resources from that in the late Middle Ages. 
This discussion poses, and also gives clues about the answers to, two 
crucial questions. First, why do the groups with conflicting interests not 
agree on the set of economic institutions that maximize aggregate growth? 
Second, why do groups with political power want to change political 
institutions in their favor? In the context of the example above, why did 
the gentry and merchants use their de facto political power to change 
political institutions rather than simply implement the policies they 
wanted? The issue of commitment is at the root of the answers to both 
questions. 
An agreement on the efficient set of institutions is often not 
forthcoming because of the complementarity between economic and 
political institutions and because groups with political power cannot 
commit to not using their power to change the distribution of resources in 
their favor. For example, economic institutions that increased the security 
of property rights for land and capital owners during the Middle Ages 
would not have been credible as long as the monarch monopolized 
political power. He could promise to respect property rights, but then at 
some point, renege on his promise, as exemplified by the numerous 
financial defaults by medieval kings. Credible secure property rights 
necessitated a reduction in the political power of the monarch. Although 
these more secure property rights would foster economic growth, they 
were not appealing to the monarchs, who would lose their rents from 
predation and expropriation as well as various other privileges associated 
with their monopoly of political power. This is why the institutional 
changes in England as a result of the Glorious Revolution were not simply 
conceded by the Stuart kings. James II had to be deposed for the changes 
to take place. 
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The reason why political power is often used to change political 
institutions is related. In a dynamic world, individuals care not only about 
economic outcomes today but also in the future. In the example above, the 
gentry and merchants were interested in their profits and therefore in the 
security of their property rights, not only in the present but also in the 
future. Therefore, they would have liked to use their (de facto) political 
power to secure benefits in the future as well as the present. However, 
commitment to future allocations (or economic institutions) is in general 
not possible because decisions in the future are made by those who hold 
political power at the time. If the gentry and merchants would have been 
sure to maintain their de facto political power, this would not have been a 
problem. However, de facto political power is often transient, for example 
because the collective action problems that are solved to amass this power 
are likely to resurface in the future, or other groups, especially those 
controlling de jure power, can become stronger in the future. Therefore, 
any change in policies and economic institutions that relies purely on de 
facto political power is likely to be reversed in the future. In addition, 
many revolutions are followed by conflict within the revolutionaries. 
Recognizing this, the English gentry and merchants strove not just to 
change economic institutions in their favor following their victories 
against the Stuart monarchy, but also to alter political institutions and the 
future allocation of de jure power. Using political power to change 
political institutions then emerges as a useful strategy to make gains more 
durable. Consequently, political institutions and changes in political 
institutions are important as ways of manipulating future political power, 
and thus indirectly shaping future, as well as present, economic 
institutions and outcomes. 
6 Pitfalls of Reform 
The framework we have sketched above is useful in delineating a range 
of dysfunctional political equilibria and consequent economic institutions. 
We have also emphasized how it is important to understand the political 
forces and institutions that maintain these dysfunctional economic 
institutions in place and are often mutually self-reinforcing 
(complementary) with these economic institutions. Nevertheless, at 
present we do not have a satisfactory understanding of the circumstances 
under which dysfunctional political equilibria arise and sustain 
themselves. A natural idea would be to focus on specific political 
institutions such as democracy. Yet we know that democracy per se is not 
necessarily associated with better development outcomes and we all know 
the famous examples of “developmental dictatorships” such as in the 
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Republic of Korea or Taiwan, China. However, as yet, we do not 
understand why some dictatorships are developmental and others not or 
why, for instance, there has never been a developmental dictatorship in 
sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America. 
Though we cannot yet say under what circumstances political equilibria 
that lead to economic growth will arise, we can illustrate the power of the 
ideas we have developed by examining the issue of institutional reform. If 
economic institutions do not create the right incentives in society then a 
natural approach is to directly try to reform economic institutions. If 
security of property rights is the problem under kleptocracies, why not 
introduce (or force dictators to introduce) more secure property rights? 
The potential problems facing such an approach highlight the first set of 
pitfalls of institutional reform. Our framework emphasizes that one should 
not try to understand or manipulate economic institutions without 
thinking about the political forces that created or sustain them. Although 
blatant disregard for property rights is a powerful distortionary force in 
kleptocratic societies, it is not the only instrument available to a dictator 
who wants to extract resources from the rest of the society. 
The comparison of Ghana in the 1960s and 1970s and current 
Zimbabwe nicely illustrates these ideas. In Zimbabwe the mass 
expropriation and redistribution of agricultural land has led to a collapse 
in the economy (GDP per capita has apparently fallen by around 50 
percent since the introduction of the Fast-Track land reform policy in 
2000). In Ghana agricultural policies were also motivated by the desire to 
redistribute incomes (Bates, 1981), but the property rights of rural 
producers were never challenged. Instead, a succession of governments 
used monopsony marketing boards to set very low prices for crops such as 
cocoa. The instruments were very different but the motivation and 
economic effects were similar. 
This reasoning suggests that direct institutional reform in itself is 
unlikely to be effective and that instead it might be more useful to focus 
on understanding and reforming the forces that keep bad institutions in 
place. It is therefore important to focus on political institutions and the 
distribution of political power as well as the nature of economic 
institutions in thinking about potential institutional reform or institution 
building. This raises the second potential pitfall of institutional reform; 
although we have recognized the importance of political institutions, we 
are still at the beginning of understanding the complex relationship 
between political institutions and the political equilibrium. Sometimes 
changing political institutions may be insufficient, or even 
counterproductive, in leading to better economic outcomes. Once again 
the use of a theoretical framework in thinking about these issues is useful 
both for academic research and in generating better policy advice. 
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The pitfalls of institutional reform are related to the fact that patterns of 
relative economic performance are very persistent. Indeed, our framework 
emphasized persistence. This is not to say that change does not occur: it 
does, and some countries manage to dramatically change their position in 
the world income distribution. However, it is a striking fact in the 
Americas, to take one example, that the rank order of countries in terms of 
income per capita has been basically unchanged at least since the middle 
of the nineteenth century. This suggests that it is difficult to change 
institutions and there are powerful forces at work reinforcing the status 
quo. Examining the pitfalls of reform is one way of approaching this issue. 
We then move to examining successful change. 
We begin our discussion by focusing at more length on whether 
reforming specific economic institutions is likely to be effective. We argue 
that such reforms may not work if they do not change the political 
equilibrium. We then examine if these pitfalls of reform can be solved by 
reforming political institutions (thus altering the distribution of de jure 
power in society). We argue that this may not work either, because de 
facto power may persist and may override the effects of reforms to 
political institutions. From this it might seem to follow that a successful 
reform necessitates changes in both de jure and de facto power. We show 
that simultaneously changing both may not achieve real reform either, 
because the political equilibrium may be path dependent 
6.1 Persistence of Power and Incentives: the See-saw Effect 
Many dysfunctional economic institutions are supported by a system of 
specific laws and regulations that relate to economic institutions. This is 
true for the labor repressive agricultural societies of nineteenth century 
Russia and Eastern Europe (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006b) or twentieth-
century Guatemala and El Salvador, where the legal system kept workers 
in semi-servile status and blocked their mobility. It is also true of highly 
oligarchic societies with very concentrated industrial structures, such as 
modern Mexico, where specific barriers to entry block competition. An 
obvious idea might be to change the laws and regulations. For example, if 
Latin American countries grew slowly after the Second World War 
because they levied high tariffs on imports, then irrespective to what 
forces led these tariffs to be put in place, removing them ought to 
stimulate growth. This was the sort of reasoning that led to the famous 
Washington consensus. 
The first pitfall of institutional reform is that directly reforming specific 
economic institutions (such as the trade regime) may not be sufficient, and 
may even backfire. The reason why reforms of specific economic 
institutions may be ineffective is that there are many different ways and a 
multitude of instruments to achieve a specific goal. Taking away one 
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instrument without altering the balance of power in society or the basic 
political equilibrium can simply lead to the replacement of one instrument 
by another. This phenomenon was dubbed the see-saw effect by 
Acemoglu et al. (2003). 
6.1.1 Case Study: Reform and the New Clientelism in Latin America 
Prominent examples of reforms were those imposed on Latin American 
countries following the debt crisis of the 1980s. As part of packages to 
repay debt, Latin American countries abandoned many aspects of the 
economic institutions that had been prevalent since the 1930s and 1940s. 
Policy reforms that took place in the late 1980s and 1990s included 
deregulation of the trade regime and severe cuts in tariffs, privatization, 
and financial deregulation. Though this had been done earlier in Chile and 
attempted by the military regime in Argentina after 1976, this was now 
done wholesale in most Latin American countries. Even though there was 
an economic crisis, the acceptance of these policy reforms by such 
institutions as the Peronist party in Argentina appears to be quite strange. 
Enduring crises and many rounds of policy reform have not induced 
many African countries to reform. One difference, of course, is that Latin 
American countries are more democratic than African ones, making it 
more difficult to maintain the status quo in the face of economic collapse. 
Another important difference is that Latin American politicians realized 
that the policies of neoliberalism could be manipulated to fulfil clientelistic 
ends. As Roberts (1995, p. 114) convincingly argues in his analysis of the 
reforms of Fujimori, “the Peruvian case demonstrates that it may be 
possible to craft populist formulas that complement neoliberalism.” For 
example, privatization could be organized to redistribute rents by 
reducing competition and giving privatized assets as favors to political 
supporters (see Gibson, 1997; Roberts and Arce, 1998; Weyland, 1998 and 
2000). There were of course differences: for example, in Argentina the 
Peronist party distanced itself from its traditional supporters in the labor 
movement. But such a strategy was feasible because the political power of 
the labor movement had been severely damaged by repression under the 
military. The Peronist party was able to reinvent itself (Levitsky, 2003) and 
carry on with clientelism as usual. 
The see-saw effect operates here in the following sense: to win power in 
Argentina, for example, the Peronist party traditionally engaged in 
redistribution of incomes and rents. The instruments it used to do this 
included rationing of foreign exchange, or the distribution of rents via 
industrial licenses. The policy reforms of the 1990s meant that these old 
instruments could not be used. For example, the currency board took 
away the ability of rationing access to foreign exchange. But other 
instruments were available to achieve the same ends: for example, the 
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labor movements were compensated for some deregulation by being able 
to benefit from privatization. Despite the crises on the 1980s, some 
changes in the distribution of political power in Argentine society (the 
unions were weaker), and changes in the feasible instruments through 
which to pursue clientelism, the political incentive environment was 
remarkably stable over time and as a consequence there was little 
improvement in the economic incentive environment in Argentina. 
6.1.2 Case Study: the Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa 
Another important example of the see-saw effect comes from the 
politics of structural adjustment in Africa. The attempt to induce African 
countries to implement institutional reforms such as reducing distortions 
was not a success (van der Walle, 1993 and 2000), mostly for the reason 
that international financial institutions did not take into account the 
political rationale for the inefficient policies they were trying to reform. 
The most dramatic example of this is discussed by Herbst (1990) and Reno 
(1998). They argued that attempts by IFIs to induce downsizing of the 
public sector, for example by closing down unprofitable parastatals, had 
played an important role in creating civil war in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
Regimes in both countries had used public sector employment as a 
method of redistributing rents to opponents or potential opponents of the 
regime and buying political support. Once these options had been taken 
away by structural adjustment, more opposition to the regimes emerged 
and incumbents switched from using carrots to using sticks. In this story, 
policy reform induced a switch from one inefficient instrument, patronage 
through public sector employment, to an even more inefficient one, 
repression. This is the see-saw effect in action.  
6.1.3 General Lessons 
Making or imposing specific institutional reforms may have little 
impact on the general structure of economic institutions or performance if 
they leave untouched the underlying political equilibrium. Of course, as 
the framework above emphasized, political power will to some extent 
reflect economic institutions so it is possible that a change in economic 
institutions may induce a change in de facto power and ultimately in the 
broader political equilibrium. Nevertheless, as the above examples make 
clear, this is far from certain. A piecemeal approach may be dangerous. 
Often we see the symptoms, but they are precisely the symptoms of 
deeper causes. Dealing with the symptoms other than causes may 
backfire. 
Despite all of the Washington consensus reforms that took place in 
Argentina, for example, there was little change in the way politics worked. 
The political genius of Menem and the Peronist party after 1989 was to 
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recognize that the policies of the Washington consensus could be bent to 
function as “politics as usual.” In consequence there was little change in 
the underlying political equilibrium though the instruments which the 
Peronists used after 1989 were different. This perspective is of course very 
different from that which claims that the Washington consensus reformed 
failed (Rodrik, 2006). Our view is not that they failed, but that for them to 
succeed it would be necessary to induce a change in the political 
equilibrium in Argentina. Though it is possible that such reforms could 
change the political equilibrium, it did not happen. 
The points are related to those made by Stigler (1971 and 1982) and 
Coate and Morris (2005) in their discussion of the political economy of 
income redistribution. Stigler pointed out that it was political incentives 
that led income redistribution to take a socially inefficient form. For 
instance, although it might be better to redistribute to farmers by giving 
them lump-sum transfers, subsidizing farm output might be more 
attractive politically because it was not perceived as income redistribution 
by other voters (see Coate and Morris, 1995, for a formalization of this 
idea). This being the case, Coate and Morris (2005) noted that policy 
reform that aimed at banning the use of particular inefficient instruments 
might be counterproductive because rational politicians would already be 
using the least-cost way of redistributing, given the political constraints 
and incentives they faced. 
6.2 Persistence of De Facto Power 
The last section illustrated that reforming specific economic institutions 
without perturbing the underlying political equilibrium may not lead to 
improved economic institutions or performance. Moreover, we shall now 
argue that even reforming de jure power (for instance enfranchising 
former slaves) or introducing democracy may not be sufficient to induce 
broader institutional change. The reason why changes in de jure power 
may not be sufficient to trigger a change in the political equilibrium is that 
the political and economic system is kept in place by a combination of de 
jure and de facto political power. An external or internal impetus to 
change de jure institutions may still leave the sources of de facto power 
intact, and groups that have lost their de jure power may use their de facto 
power in order to recreate a system similar to the one that has departed 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006c and 2008). The new system may be as 
inefficient as the old one. 
This is not to argue that reform of de jure institutions is not possible or 
that it is irrelevant. For example, democratization in many European 
societies in the nineteenth century appears to have significantly changed 
economic institutions, for example leading to sustained expansions of 
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educational systems (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Lindert, 2004). 
Nevertheless, this section emphasizes that such reforms come with pitfalls. 
6.2.1 Case Study: the Persistence of the Southern Equilibrium 
 
“De landlord is landlord, de politician is landlord, de judge is landlord, de 
shurf is landlord, ever'body is landlord, en we ain' got nothin.” 
Testimony of a Mississippi sharecropper to an official of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration in 1936 (Schulman, 1994, p. 16) 
 
An important example that illustrates our thesis is the continuation of 
the economic system based on labor repression, plantation, and low-wage 
uneducated labor in the U.S. South before and after the significant changes 
in political institutions brought about by the Civil War. Most obviously 
these changes in de jure power included the enfranchisement of the freed 
slaves. 
Before the Civil War, the South was significantly poorer than the U.S. 
average income at about 70 percent of GDP per capita. The South lacked 
industry (Bateman and Weiss, 1981; Wright, 1986, Table 2.4, p. 27) and in 
1860 the total manufacturing output of the South was less than that of 
either Pennsylvania, New York, or Massachusetts (Cobb, 1984, p. 6). The 
South had very low rates of urbanization (around 9 percent as opposed to 
35 percent in the Northeast) and relatively little investment in 
infrastructure. For example, the density of railroads (miles of track 
divided by land area) was three times higher in the North than in 
Southern states. The situation with respect to canal mileage was similar 
(Wright, 1986, Table 2.1, p. 21). Perhaps more important, especially in the 
context of the potential for future economic growth and industrialization, 
the South was not even innovative for the sectors in which it specialized. 
The relatively backwardness of the South was because of the plantation 
economy and slavery. Wright (1986) argues that because slaves were a 
mobile asset, there was no incentive for planter interests to support 
investment in public goods such as infrastructure, and so manufacturing 
could not develop. Bateman and Weiss (1981) show that Southern planters 
did not invest in industry, even though the rate of return was superior to 
that in agriculture. A plausible explanation for the lack of innovation is 
that slavery limited the possibilities for productive investment. Slaves 
were forbidden to own property or to become educated in most Southern 
states, presumably because this made them easier to control. But this 
pattern of labor repression also condemned plantations to low-skilled 
labor forces and possibly removed the incentives of planters to innovate. 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the income per capita of the South fell 
to about 50 percent of the U.S. average. If the organization of the slave 
economy had been the reason why the South had been relatively 
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backward in 1865, one might have imagined that the abolition of slavery 
in 1865 would have removed this blockage to Southern prosperity. The 
evidence and historical interpretations show that the abolition of slavery 
had a surprisingly small effect on the Southern economy. Though planters 
initially tried and failed to reintroduce the gang-labor system with the 
freed slaves, out of the ashes of the Civil War emerged a low-wage, labor-
intensive economy based on labor repression. Cut off from the rest of the 
United States, income per capita remained at about half the national 
average until the 1940s when it finally began slowly to converge. Just as 
before the Civil War, there was systematic underinvestment in education 
(Margo, 1990). The main incentive for this seems to have been to impede 
migration (see Wright, 1986, p. 79). In 1900 all but two of the non-Southern 
states had enacted compulsory schooling laws, while none had such laws 
in the South except Kentucky (Woodward, 1951, p. 399). Though industrial 
development did begin more systematically after 1865, Cobb (1984, p. 17) 
notes: 
 
The industries that grew most rapidly in the post-Reconstruction decades 
were typical of an underdeveloped economy in that they utilized both cheap 
labor and abundant raw materials … such industries hardly promised to 
elevate the region to economic parity with the rest of the nation. 
 
So why did the economic system of the South change so little following 
the Civil War, especially given the significant changes in political 
institutions? At first, this persistence of economic institutions appears at 
odds with the significant changes in the distribution of de jure power that 
took place after the Civil War, for example, with the enfranchisement of 
the freed slaves, and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, which had 
previously cemented the political power of the South in the federal 
government. 
We believe the answer is related to the exercise of de facto political 
power by the Southern landed elites to compensate for the loss of their de 
jure political power. Consistent with our approach, there was considerable 
persistence in the identity and power of the political elites. For example, 
Wiener (1978) studied the persistence of the planter elite in five counties of 
the black belt of western Alabama. Tracking families from the U.S. census 
and considering those with at least US$10,000 of real estate, he found that 
(p. 9) “of the 236 members of the planter elite in 1850, 101 remained in the 
elite in 1870.” Interestingly, this rate of persistence was very similar to that 
experienced in the antebellum period: “of the 236 wealthiest planters 
families of 1850, only 110 remained in the elite a decade later” (p. 9). 
Nevertheless, “of the 25 planters with the largest landholdings in 1870, 18 
(72 percent) had been in the elite families in 1860; 16 had been in the 1850 
elite group.” 
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After the end of the Civil War, more or less the same group of planter 
elites controlled the land and used various instruments to re-exert their 
control over the labor force. Though the specific economic institution of 
slavery did not persist, the evidence shows a clear line of persistence in the 
economic system of the South based on plantation-type agriculture with 
cheap labor. This economic system was maintained through a variety of 
channels, including both control of local politics and exercise of potentially 
violent de facto power. As a consequence, in the words of W.E.B. Du Bois 
(1903, p. 88), the South became “simply an armed camp for intimidating 
black folk.” 
The planter elite successfully staffed or co-opted the members of the 
Freedmen's Bureau, whose remit was to supervise the freed slaves. In 1865 
the state legislature of Alabama passed the Black Code, an important 
landmark towards the repression of black labor. Wiener (1978, p. 58) 
describes this as follows: “The Black Code of Alabama included two key 
laws intended to assure the planters a reliable supply of labor - a vagrancy 
law, and a law against the „enticement‟ of laborers.” These laws were 
designed to impede labor mobility and reduce competition in the labor 
market. 
In addition to modelling the legal system in their favor, “Planters used 
Klan terror to keep blacks from leaving the plantation regions, to get them 
to work, and keep them at work, in the cotton field” (Wiener, 1978, p. 62). 
In his seminal study of the politics of the South after World War II, Key 
(1949, p. 9) sums up the pattern of persistence of the institutions of the 
South both before and after the Civil War as the “extraordinary 
achievement of a relatively small minority - the whites of the areas of 
heavy Negro population.” 
A key to the persistence of the antebellum system after the Civil War 
was the continued control over land. For example, in the debate over the 
redistribution of 40 acres of land to the freedmen (vetoed by President 
Andrew Johnson in 1865), Congressman George Washington Julian 
argued (quoted in Wiener, 1978, p. 6): 
 
Of what avail would be an act of congress totally abolishing slavery … if the 
old agricultural basis of aristocratic power shall remain? 
 
A third strategy, again consistent with the emphasis on the de facto 
political power of the elite in our theoretical analysis, was control of the 
local political system. Following the Civil War, the period called 
Reconstruction lasted until 1877. In this period Republican politicians 
contested power in the South and, with the help of the Union Army, 
engineered some social changes. Nevertheless, this induced a systematic 
backlash in the guise of support for the Democratic Party and the so-called 
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“Redeemers.” In 1877, in the context of a log-roll between President 
Rutherford Hayes and Southern national politicians, Union soldiers were 
withdrawn from the South and the region left to its own devices. The 
period after 1877 then marked the real recrudescence of the antebellum 
elite. The “redemption” of the South involved the systematic 
disenfranchisement of the black (and poor white) population through the 
use of poll taxes and literacy tests (Key, 1949; Kousser, 1974) and the 
creation of the one-party Democratic regime. 
Key (1949, pp. 309–10), in his analysis of the primary elections of the 
Democratic party, noted the hegemony of southern society's “upper 
brackets” and the political marginalization of its “lower brackets.” He 
discusses in detail the control of North Carolina's economic oligarchy over 
politics, noting that (p. 211): “The effectiveness of the oligarchy's control 
has been achieved through the elevation to office of persons 
fundamentally in harmony with its viewpoint.” 
This picture is also confirmed by the analysis of Wright (1986, p. 78), 
who writes: “Even in the 1930s, southern representatives in Washington 
did not use their powerful positions to push for new federal projects, 
hospitals, public works and so on. They didn't, that is, as long as the 
foundations of the low-wage regional economy persisted.” 
In addition to disenfranchisement, a whole gamut of segregationist 
legislation - the so-called Jim Crow laws - was enacted (see Woodward, 
1955, for the classic analysis). These laws turned the postbellum South into 
an effective “apartheid” society where blacks and whites lived different 
lives. As in South Africa, these laws were aimed at controlling the black 
population and its labor supply. 
Consequently, the South entered the twentieth century as a primarily 
rural society. “It remained an agrarian society with a backward 
technology that still employed hand labor and mule power virtually 
unassisted by mechanical implements” (Ransom and Sutch, 2001, pp. 175–
176). In 1900, the South's urbanization rate was 13.5 percent, as compared 
to 60 percent in the Northeast (Cobb, 1984, p. 25). 
Ransom and Sutch's (2001, p. 186) assessment of the implications of this 
economic and political system in the South for economic progress is 
representative of the consensus view: “Southerners erected an economic 
system that failed to reward individual initiative on the part of blacks and 
was therefore ill-suited to their economic advancement. As a result, the 
inequities originally inherited from slavery persisted. But there was a by-
product of this effort at racial repression, the system tended to cripple all 
economic growth”. 
 
When whites used threats of violence to keep blacks from gaining an 
education, practicing a trade, or purchasing land, they systematically prevented 
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blacks from following the three routes most commonly travelled by other 
Americans in their quest for self-advancement. With over half the population 
held in ignorance and forced to work as agricultural laborers, it is no wonder 
that the South was poor, underdeveloped, and without signs of economic 
progress. (Ransom and Sutch, 2001, p. 177) 
 
All in all, the Southern equilibrium, based on the exercise of de facto 
power by the landed elite, plantation agriculture, and low-wage, 
uneducated labor, persisted well into the twentieth century, and only 
started to crumble after World War II. Interestingly, it was only after the 
demise of this Southern equilibrium that the South started its process of 
rapid convergence to the North. 
6.2.2 Case Study: the Reinvention of the Cambodian People's Party 
In 1978 senior Khmer Rouge cadres, including Heng Samrin, Chea Sim, 
and Hun Sen, escaped to Vietnam after falling out with Pol Pot. In 1979 
they were placed in power in Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese Army and 
formed the Communist Party of Kampuchea. In the 1980s they tried to 
implement socialism, but after the Berlin Wall came down Hun Sen and 
his colleagues renamed their party the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), 
became democrats, and negotiated an opening of the political system 
(Hughes, 2003). Though this involved the return of King Norodom 
Sihanouk from exile and necessitated that Hun Sen share power, his party, 
the CPP, managed to reinvent itself as a democratic political machine. For 
instance, in 2002 elections were introduced for commune chiefs, who had 
previously been appointed. The CPP won 1,591 of 1,621. Primarily via its 
control of the bureaucracy and military, the CPP wins every election and 
those who oppose it too strenuously, such as Sam Rainsy, are exiled or 
arrested. Here despite the change in de jure institutions, the huge de facto 
power of the CPP means that they can dominate democratic politics 
through superior organization and resources, heavily aided by threats and 
intimidation. 
 
6.2.3 General Lessons 
Just as reforming economic institutions without changing the political 
equilibrium may not improve the institutional equilibrium, so changing de 
jure power, while leaving the sources of de facto power intact, may have 
little impact on economic performance. In the U.S. South, the same 
economic system based on the repression of cheap labor got reinstituted 
after Reconstruction. Even though the enfranchisement of the freed slaves 
meant that there had been a change in de jure power, and after the Civil 
War blacks exercised this power and voted in large numbers, Southern 
elites were able to use their de facto power to reassert control over labor 
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and eventually by the 1890s disenfranchise the blacks. The persistence of 
de facto power stemmed from the fact that white elites had kept hold of 
the land after the Civil War, and because these elites had avoided being 
killed during the Civil War and still had a huge comparative advantage 
over blacks in the ability to engage in collective action. Control was 
exercised via coercion, lynching, the Ku Klux Klan, and other extra-legal 
methods and eventually institutionalized via control of state legislatures. 
In Cambodia, the transition away from socialism after 1989 and the 
opening of the political system and creation of de jure democracy after 
1993 have not been sufficient to change the political equilibrium. The 
Cambodian People's Party, led by former Khmer Rouge cadres like Hun 
Sen and Chea Sim, have been able to use their control of the bureaucracy 
and the army to win elections and have emasculated, co-opted, and 
sometimes banned the opposition. Though there have been large changes 
in specific economic institutions, particularly with the move away from 
socialism to capitalism, and alterations in de jure political institutions, the 
society continues to be run to the benefit of a small elite who are free to 
enrich themselves at the expense of the wider society. 
The general lesson seems to be that change in institutions, which affects 
the distribution of de jure political power, needs to be complemented by 
changes in the sources of de facto political power of the elite and 
reductions in the benefits that political incumbents have in intensifying 
their use of de facto political power (for example, use of paramilitaries, 
bribery, corruption, and so forth). 
6.3 The Iron Law of Oligarchy 
The conclusion from the last section seems to be that to change the 
political equilibrium there needs to be changes in both de jure and de facto 
power. For instance, if there is an elite that is structuring institutions to its 
benefit with adverse aggregate effects, then to engineer a transition to a 
better equilibrium both their de jure and de facto power must be 
simultaneously reformed. To take a contemporary example, this would 
imply that to reform Iraq, it would not be sufficient to simply remove 
Saddam Hussein and introduce democracy. This is because the Ba'ath 
Party would still have had terrific de facto power and would be able to 
capture the new political institutions. To really achieve reform it would be 
necessary to undermine the de facto power of the Ba'ath Party, something 
the U.S. government clearly succeeded in doing. 
Unfortunately, things are not quite so simple as this. This is because 
even if de jure and de facto power changes, those who acquire the power 
in the new political equilibrium may not have the correct incentives either. 
More importantly, their incentives to use their power and the institutions 
they find it optimal to create may be fundamentally shaped by the status 
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quo they replace - they may be path dependent. If an elite with power is 
initially structuring economic institutions to extract rents from society, 
then the very fact that it is doing this may induce a new elite to do 
likewise. The replacement of one elite by another may therefore do little to 
improve economic performance. This pitfall is reminiscent of the classic 
idea in sociology of an iron law of oligarchy going back to the work of 
Michels (1962), Mosca (1939), and Pareto (1968). This hypothesis states that 
it is never possible to have real change in society, because when new 
groups mobilize or are created in the process of socioeconomic change, 
they simply replace preexisting elites and groups and behave in 
qualitatively similar ways (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2007). There seem 
to be many circumstances in which “iron law” types of behavior may 
occur and there are quite possibly many mechanisms that can generate 
behavior like this. We focus on two that appear to be first order. The first 
is motivated by the experience of Bolivia following the Revolution of 1952. 
The second is motivated by the experience of Africa, where many 
countries have experienced sequences of one bad leader after another. 
6.3.1 The Bolivian Revolution and the Iron Law 
Bolivia features centrally in accounts of comparative development in 
the Americas. It was at the heart of the Inca Empire with a high density of 
indigenous peoples and during the colonial period economic institutions 
designed to extract rents - the encomienda, repartamiento, and the Potosí mita 
(forced labor draft for the silver mines) - were all central. Although the 
mita was abolished at independence, a highly inegalitarian and 
authoritarian society persisted. In 1950, for example, 6 percent of 
landowners owned 92 percent of all lands and the smallest 60 percent of 
landowners owned 0.2 percent; and the tin mines, which formed the basis 
of the export economy, were owned by three families. A mere 31 percent 
of the adult population was literate and only 4 percent of the labor force 
was employed in industry. Indians still were subject to unpaid pongueaje 
(personal services) for the landowners whose lands they worked. 
The remains of this system were swept away by the Bolivian revolution 
of 1952, which was masterminded by the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario), a political party that had formed in urban areas in the 
1940s to contest the power of the traditional elite. Following the 
Revolution, the MNR formed a government that implemented land 
reform, expropriated large estates, and redistributed them to the labor 
force and Indian communities. It also introduced universal suffrage by 
abolishing literacy requirement on voting and nationalized the mines of 
the tin barons. 
These appear to be huge, radical institutional changes. In particular 
there was a shift in the distribution of both de jure and de facto power. 
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Surely Bolivia was launched on a new path of institutional and economic 
development. At the very least one would have anticipated a sustained 
fall in inequality. Unfortunately none of these good outcomes occurred. 
Following the Revolution, the 1950s saw a failed attempt by the MNR to 
create a one-party state and in the process they rebuilt the military that 
had been disarmed in 1952. They were also able to use clientelism to gain 
the support of the indigenous majority. Indeed, there are striking 
comparisons between the traditional clientelism that had existed before 
1952 and that which emerged during the regime of the MNR afterwards. 
In a seminal study, Heath (1972) showed that although the identity of the 
patrons were different and the instruments of clientelism had changed 
following the institutional changes brought by 1952, there were very 
strong similarities in the basic structure of the political equilibrium. Kelley 
and Klein (1981) estimated that 10 years after the Revolution, inequality 
had returned to 1952 levels. 
How can we understand an outcome like this? We believe that there are 
mechanisms that can generate persistence in the political equilibrium even 
when de jure and de facto power changes and can produce an iron law of 
oligarchy. The idea is quite simple. Initially in Bolivia institutions were 
structured to the benefit of traditional elites. A new elite emerged, 
spearheaded by the MNR. The MNR needed to win support of the 
campesinos and other urban groups. To do this they had to develop a 
political strategy, but the form that strategy took was highly influenced by 
the strategies being used by the traditional elite. The traditional elite were 
clientelistic, so it was optimal to use clientelism to compete with them. 
Similarly, the traditional elite ran a political system with few checks and 
balances. Would the MNR find it optimal to create a political system with 
checks and balances? Not necessarily. After all, though this might have 
appealed to citizens and garnered more support, it would also have been 
disadvantageous to them once they were in power. Hence there is a well-
defined tradeoff. Indeed, the MNR were able to attain power and create 
highly imperfect political institutions that they were then able to 
undermine. 
6.3.2 General Lessons 
One might conclude from our discussion of the U.S. South that the real 
problem was the persistence of the elite and their resources. If only the 
North had implemented land reform and given the freed slaves their 50 
acres and a mule, everything would have been different. The example of 
the Bolivian Revolution shows that the situation is more complex than 
this. In Bolivia the previous elite were expropriated and their power taken 
away, yet the new elite that emerged (the MNR) used strategies that were 
very similar to the old elite and that had the same impact on economic 
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institutions. Thus there can be huge path dependence in political 
equilibria, even when de jure and de facto power changes hands from one 
group to another. This implies that, for reformers, a policy of changing 
political institutions and trying simultaneously to undermine the de facto 
power of incumbents may not work. In order to reform Iraq it is not 
sufficient to introduce democracy and undermine the Ba'ath Party. 
Instead, reformers must change the incentives of new elites and decouple 
their choices from those of the previous elites. 
6.3.3 Fighting Fire with Fire 
A related phenomena to what happened in Bolivia, but that seems to 
involve different mechanisms, arises mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. Many 
African countries have experienced changes in the identity of elites and 
groups in power, but the new leaders seem to be as bad as the old. Most 
strikingly this happened with the transition from colonial authority. After 
suffering under King Leopold and then the Belgian colonial state, the 
Congolese were faced with Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Mobutu, and 
Laurent Kabila. Is this just a coincidence? Similar transitions occurred in 
many African countries. After the Cocoa farmers in Ghana had protested 
against the policies of the British authorities, they were exploited even 
more vigorously by the government of Kwame Nkrumah. Other salient 
examples in British colonies are Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone and perhaps 
the transition from Ian Smith to Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Elsewhere 
on the continent the transition from Haile Selassia to Mengistu Haile 
Mariam in the 1970s is yet another example (see Meredith, 2005, on the 
extraordinary extent to which Mengistu ended up behaving like Haile 
Selassie). Transitions from one bad leader to another occurred not just at 
the time of decolonization, but also subsequently. In Zambia, for instance, 
the long struggle to remove Kenneth Kaunda and his United National 
Independence Party from power was headed by Frederick Chiluba and 
the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Chiluba was elected 
president in 1991 after 27 years of UNIP rule. Though Chiluba introduced 
economic reforms, he also engaged in massive corruption. 
The succession of bad leaders seems to be another example of the iron 
law of oligarchy. On the surface of it there appears to be change and often 
IFIs and foreign governments rush in to give aid and support to the new 
regime, only to become disillusioned with the lack of real change. There 
may be very good reasons for this phenomenon, however (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2007). Consider a situation where a society has a very predatory 
ruler or ruling clique that is willing to use repression and violence and 
bend all the rules to stay in power. How can citizens remove such a ruler? 
To get rid of it, it may be necessary to “fight fire with fire” and support a 
challenger who can be as unscrupulous as the incumbent regime. Think 
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perhaps of the difference between supporting Mahatma Gandhi or Nelson 
Mandela. Gandhi was obviously a highly principled leader who, had he 
attained office, would have had the public interest at heart. It turned out 
that this was also true of Nelson Mandela, but this must have been much 
less clear in the period before he attained office. In the 1960s Mandela was 
prepared to be tough and he played an important role in the formation of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the African National Congress. 
Who would citizens back, Gandhi or Mandela? A Mandela is attractive 
because he has a much bigger chance of removing the Apartheid state 
from power, yet when he wins will he be as bad? Gandhi was clearly 
better than British colonialism, yet he had a much smaller chance of 
winning. So there is a well defined trade-off here. In African countries, 
where it is easy to break laws and there are few checks and balances, it 
may be relatively attractive for citizens to fight fire with fire. Yet doing 
this runs the risk of replacing one bad leader with another and not 
experiencing any improvement in the economic environment. 
6.3.4 General Lessons 
When citizens decide to fight fire with fire what can reformers do? The 
mechanism at work here is different from the one we hypothesized for 
Bolivia. There the initial strategy of the incumbent elite influenced the 
strategy of a new elite. Here, however, it is the citizens who make the most 
important decisions and this generates different implications. Again, 
direct reform of economic institutions is unlikely to be very useful and this 
mechanism applies in environments where political institutions probably 
face few constraints on the behavior of politicians. Nevertheless, this may 
be a case where external intervention to remove bad rulers would imply 
that citizens no longer need to support unscrupulous opponents to 
generate change. Some potential lessons could therefore be drawn from 
the recent experience of Sierra Leone, where the strong intervention of 
British soldiers in 2000 seems to have played an important role is 
destroying the power of various rebel movements and precipitating the 
movement of the country back to democracy and some stability. Now it 
may no longer be necessary for the citizens of Sierra Leone to fight fire 
with fire, as perhaps they did in 1967 when they put Siaka Stevens in 
power. The case of Sierra Leone, however, suggests how incomplete our 
understanding of dysfunctional political equilibria is. In the recent 
presidential election of September 2007 the people voted back into power 
the All People's Congress Party, the political machine built by Stevens that 
he and the ruling clique used as a basis to rule and loot the country for 
two decades before the onset of the civil war. 
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7 Successful Reform 
In the last section we used our framework to explain why reform is so 
difficult and why patterns of relative economic performance are so 
persistent over time. Nevertheless, countries do reform their institutions 
and move onto different development paths. Obvious examples that come 
to mind from the post–World War II development experience include 
Taiwan, China in the late 1950s; Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and 
Botswana in the 1960s; and Chile, Mauritius, and China in the 1970s. There 
have been important historical episodes of reform as well. As we noted 
earlier, Britain underwent an important process of institutional change in 
the seventeenth century, and again in the nineteenth century when it 
expanded democratic rights and began to invest more systematically in 
education. Obviously some of these instances of institutional transition 
took place under democracy, as in Botswana and Mauritius, while some 
took place under authoritarian regimes. Some countries, such as Spain, 
experienced institutional reforms under authoritarianism in the 1960s and 
democracy in the 1980s. 
Earlier in the paper we described what drove this process of change in 
Britain. In particular we argued that there were changes in economic 
opportunities, which changed both interests and the balance of de facto 
power in society, which in turn destabilized the initial absolutist 
equilibrium. This led to a process of cumulative change in political and 
economic institutions. This did not end with the Glorious Revolution but 
extended to the Reform Acts of the nineteenth century and many other 
subsequent changes in economic institutions. All of these other examples 
of successful reform can be described within our framework. Let us 
consider just one example, Botswana. 
As is well known, Botswana, a small, tropical, landlocked country in 
sub-Saharan Africa has had the fastest average rate of economic growth in 
the world in the last 35 years. So what explains Botswana's success? At a 
proximate level Botswana has been aided by large quantities of diamonds, 
yet in general natural resources are not associated with successful 
economic outcomes in Africa. It has also had very good macroeconomic 
and microeconomic policies and ranks at the same level as Western 
European countries in terms of indices of governance and corruption 
(Parsons and Robinson, 2006). The argument of Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2003) and Parsons and Robinson (2006) is that Botswana‟s 
success is precisely because of its economic and political institutions. 
Botswana benefited immensely from having indigenous political 
institutions that put constraints on Tswana chiefs and political elites, and 
in the nineteenth century the Tswana tribes engaged in a quite successful 
process of defensive modernization that strengthened these institutions. 
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Significantly, these institutions were not undone by the impact of 
colonialism, which was very marginal in the country. Thus at 
independence Bostwana emerged with political institutions that placed 
checks and balances on political elites. This was important for the security 
of property rights and governance and it is an almost unique phenomenon 
in Africa. In consequence economic institutions were good. Economic 
institutions were also good because the Tswana chiefs and elite were 
heavily invested in the main economic sector at independence, which was 
ranching. Hence, as in Britain after the Glorious Revolution, political elites 
had a vested interest in economic institutions that were socially desirable. 
In addition, other historical factors were certainly important, such as the 
fact that the modern nation of Botswana had a certain coherence that other 
African natures lacked. Much of the apparent homogeneity of Botswana is 
actually an outcome of the process of state formation, rather than a 
prerequisite for it (see Leith, 2005, on this). 
Botswana did well because its political equilibrium facilitated good 
economic institutions in rather a similar way to the situation in late 
seventeenth century Britain. Indeed we can even understand this in the 
same way in terms of the interaction of de jure political constraints and 
economic interests. The agenda ahead is to understand better how such an 
equilibrium can be created elsewhere in Africa. 
8 Conclusions 
There are several key conclusions that we believe can be drawn from 
this analysis. The main determinants of cross-country differences in 
income per capita are differences in economic institutions. Though 
institutions often persist for long periods of time and have unintended 
consequences, differences in institutions across countries primarily reflect 
the outcome of different collective choices. Different collective choices 
reflect differences in political institutions and different distributions of 
political power. As a result, understanding underdevelopment implies 
understanding why different countries get stuck in political equilibria that 
result in bad economic institutions. Solving the problem of development 
entails understanding what instruments can be used to push a society 
from a bad to a good political equilibrium. Unfortunately, this is far 
beyond what we understand at the moment and, as yet, we do not have a 
deep enough comprehension of the forces that lead to good or bad 
political equilibria. There are some robust patterns in the cross-national 
data and some obvious things that can be said. For instance, in the case of 
Africa, promoting democracy and accountability and checks and balances 
will almost certainly lead to better economic policies and institutions. 
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Though it is true that there have been developmental authoritarian 
regimes in East Asia, there has never been one in sub-Saharan Africa, so 
creating one seems a good option neither from the point of view of 
political freedom nor economic growth. Nevertheless, there are clear 
pitfalls in promoting both good economic and political institutions and we 
cannot say that improvements in accountability, for instance, will push 
African countries onto much better growth paths. In this paper we have 
focused on these pitfalls and showed that they demonstrate how cautious 
one must be in promoting reforms. For instance, one cannot necessarily 
change the political equilibrium by introducing democracy. These pitfalls 
also illustrate why, for example, so many people in Latin America have 
been disappointed by the results of the apparent application of the 
Washington Consensus. It is not that these reforms would not be good, 
other things being equal; it is just that other things are not equal. Reform 
in one area leads other areas to become unreformed. Our analysis poses 
challenging problems for those who would wish to solve the problem of 
development and poverty. Nevertheless, experience strongly suggests that 
it is difficult to solve these problems and we believe that the main reasons 
for this are the forces we have outlined in this paper. Better development 
policy will only come when we recognize this and understand these forces 
better. 
Nevertheless, countries do reform their institutions and move from 
situations of stagnation to rapid growth. We have argued that this is 
because of changes in the political equilibrium. It can hardly be denied, for 
example, that the rapid take-off of growth in China after 1978 was a result 
of policy and institutional reforms. These were a direct result of the defeat 
of the “Gang of Four” and a dramatic shift in those who controlled the 
Communist Party. Growth did not occur because the culture of the 
Chinese changed, or because some geographical constraint was lifted. 
Growth also did not occur because previously the Chinese were mistaken 
about the correct form of policy. They did not suddenly discover what to 
do. Rather, growth occurred because the political equilibrium changed in 
a way that gave more power to those who wanted to push through 
reforms. Said in this way our analysis is an optimistic one. The 
institutional approach opens the promise that if we can understand the 
determinants of political equilibria then we can really design interventions 
that make poor societies prosperous. There is no intrinsic reason why Mali 
is poor and it is possible to make its citizens rich. 
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